Philipp Külpmann

Assistant Professor, Institute of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest
and Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, University of Vienna

philipp.kulpmann@uni-corvinus.hu

CV

My research interest lies primarily in Experimental Economics and Game Theory.
Currently, I am organizing the Budapest Experimental and Behavioral Economics (BEBE) Seminar.

Publications

Working papers

  • Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment, with Davit Khantadze.
    We investigate the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9% of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, we compare our results with predictions of commonly used models of higher-order beliefs.
  • Rational Delay of Effort in Projects with Uncertain Requirements.
    We analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. This makes the model very flexible, since the distribution over the required effort for a breakthrough can model different types of projects. We characterize the equilibrium and the welfare-maximizing effort path for general distributions of this breakthrough effort and show that three effects are at work: free-riding (i.e., working less), an encouragement effect (i.e., working more), similar to Bolton and Harris (1999), and a delay of effort (i.e., working later). This encouragement effect increases or decreases the amount of work players put into the project depending on the type of uncertainty faced. Furthermore, the delay of effort explains the frequently observed last-minute rush before a deadline as a result of the actions of not only rational but also welfare-maximizing players.

In progress

  • Purifying Randomness? Testing Harsanyi's Idea in the Lab, with Wieland Müller and Alexander K. Wagner.
  • Using Ambiguity in Negotiations: An Experimental Analysis, with Frank Riedel.
  • Trade Network Formation in Cournot Markets, with Yu Chen.
  • The Use of Decoy Effects in Video Game Pricing, with Fábián Garas and Botond Ujvári.

Contact

Office

Building E, room 258 (2nd floor)

Postal Address

Philipp Külpmann
Institute of Economics
Fővám tér 8
1093 Budapest, Hungary