Philipp Külpmann

My research interest lies primarily in Experimental Economics and Game Theory.
Currently, I am organizing the Budapest Experimental and Behavioral Economics (BEBE) Seminar.

Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment, with Davit Khantadze.
We investigate the effect of absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the subjects have chosen the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9% of the players had first-order beliefs that lead to coordination failure and another 9% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs. Furthermore, we compare our results with predictions of commonly used models of higher-order beliefs.
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Purifying Randomness? Testing Harsanyi's Idea in the Lab, with Wieland Müller and Alexander K. Wagner.
Using Ambiguity in Negotiations: An Experimental Analysis, with Frank Riedel.
Trade Network Formation in Cournot Markets, with Yu Chen.
The Use of Decoy Effects in Video Game Pricing, with Fábián Garas and Botond Ujvári.