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RESEARCH INTERESTS

Experimental Economics, Game Theory

EMPLOYMENT

Senior Scientist / Lab Manager , VCEE, University of Vienna	2017 –
Post-Doctoral Fellow , University of Graz	2016 – 2017

EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics (<i>summa cum laude</i>) , Bielefeld University Dissertation Topic: “ <i>Essays on Teamwork</i> ” Advisors: Christoph Kuzmics, Frank Riedel	2016
Visiting Research Student , University of Warwick	2015 – 2016
Visiting Research Student , University of Warwick	2013
Visiting Ph.D. Student , Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne	2013
Diplom in Economics (equiv. B.Sc. and M.Sc.), University of Bonn Thesis: “ <i>A Dynamic Buyer-Seller Network</i> ” (Advisor: Benny Moldovanu)	2012

PUBLICATIONS

Comparing Theories of One-Shot Play Out of Treatment (with Christoph Kuzmics), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2022.

Probabilistic Transitivity in Sports (with Johannes Tiwisina), *Computers & Operations Research*, 2019.

WORKING PAPERS

Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment (with Davit Khantadze, under review, **job-market paper**)

Strategic Use of Ambiguity (with Frank Riedel)

Rational Delay of Effort in Projects with Uncertain Requirements (Reject & Resubmit at Economic Theory)

WORK IN PROGRESS

Experimental Purification (with Wieland Müller and Alexander K. Wagner)

Network Formation in Cournot Markets (with Yu Chen)

SOFTWARE

oottest: Out-of-Treatment Testing in R (with Panagiota Charalampidou), 2022.

SCHOLARSHIPS / GRANTS

Grant of the **Heinrich Graf Hardegg'sche Stiftung** 2018

Selected to attend the **6th Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting on Economic Sciences** 2017

Doctoral Scholarship by the Bielefeld Young Researchers' Fund 2016

German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) Scholarship for Great Britain 2015 – 2016

Mobility Grant of the Bielefeld Graduate School in Theoretical Sciences (BGTS) 2015

Research Grant: “*Experimental Investigation of the Role of Higher-order Beliefs about the Cognitive Skill of Others’ in Coordination Games*“ (KU 3071/1) by the German Research Foundations (DFG) (PI: Christoph Kuzmics) 2015

Full Ph.D. Scholarship by the German Research Foundations (DFG) through the “Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management“ (BiGSEM) 2012 – 2015

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Referee for: *Games and Economic Behavior*, *International Journal of Game Theory*, *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*, *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *Journal of Sports Economics*

Lindau Alumni peer reviewer for the 7th Lindau Meeting on Economic Sciences 2022

Workshop “Faszination Wirtschaftswissenschaften” – Workshop for high-school students during the Annual Conference of the Verein für Socialpolitik 2017

7th EBIM Doctoral Workshop on Economic Theory (organizer), Bielefeld University 2012

TEACHING / WORK EXPERIENCE

<i>Lab Manager for the Vienna Center of Experimental Economics</i> , University of Vienna.	2017 – 2023
<i>Empirical Data and Analysis II (B.A.)</i> , Vienna University of Economics and Business.	2019 – 2020
<i>Designing Economic Experiments (M.A.)</i> , University of Vienna.	2019
<i>Consumer and Producer Choice (B.Sc.)</i> , University of Graz.	2016 – 2017
<i>Introduction: Experimental Game Theory (B.Sc.)</i> , Bielefeld University.	2015
TA: <i>Microeconomics 2 (M.Sc.)</i> (Sürücü / Staudigl), Bielefeld University.	2015
TA: <i>Microeconomics 1 (M.Sc.)</i> (Oktay Sürücü), Bielefeld University.	2014 – 2015
TA: <i>Microeconomics B (B.Sc.)</i> (Dennis Gärtner), University of Bonn.	2011
Student Research Assistant (Benny Moldovanu), University of Bonn.	2007 – 2011

CONFERENCES / INVITED TALKS

<i>Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association 2022</i> , University of Vienna	2022
<i>10th International Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics</i> , Toulouse School of Economics	2019
<i>12th Maastricht Behavioral Experimental Economics Symposium</i> , Maastricht University	2019
<i>Experimental Day Innsbruck-Vienna</i> , University of Innsbruck	2018
<i>Economic Theory Lunch Seminar</i> , Bielefeld University	2018
<i>Research Seminar in Economics and Management</i> , Paderborn University	2018
<i>Central European Program in Economic Theory Workshop</i> , University of Udine	2018
<i>Economic Theory Lunch Seminar</i> , Bielefeld University	2017
<i>Vienna Center for Experimental Economics</i> , University of Vienna	2017
<i>Centre for Experimental Social Sciences Santiago</i> , Universidad de Santiago	2017
<i>RES-York Symposium on Game Theory</i> (poster), University of York	2016
<i>9th RGS Doctoral Conference in Economics</i> , Ruhr University Bochum	2016
<i>DR@W Forum</i> , University of Warwick	2016
<i>BGSE Micro Workshop</i> , University of Bonn	2015
<i>6th European Conference in Sports Economics</i> , University of Antwerp	2014
<i>QED Conference 2014</i> , Bielefeld University	2014

OTHER SKILLS

Programming

Python, R, oTree, z-Tree, Mathematica, MATLAB, Java, C, C++

Languages

German (Native), English (Fluent), Spanish (Basic), French (Basic), Dutch (Basic)

ABSTRACTS

Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment (with Davit Khantadze) (*Job Market Paper*)

We investigate the effect of the absence of common knowledge on the outcomes of coordination games in a laboratory experiment. Using cognitive types, we can explain coordination failure in pure coordination games while differentiating between coordination failure due to first- and higher-order beliefs. In our experiment, around 76% of the players chose the payoff-dominant equilibrium strategy despite the absence of common knowledge. However, 9.33% of the players had first-order beliefs that led to coordination failure, and another 9.33% exhibited coordination failure due to higher-order beliefs.

Rational Delay of Effort in Projects with Uncertain Requirements

We analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players work together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve a breakthrough is unknown, but players have a common prior about its distribution. We characterize the equilibrium and the welfare-maximizing effort path for general distributions of this breakthrough effort and show that three effects are at work: free-riding (i.e., working less), delay of effort (i.e., working later), and an encouragement effect (i.e., working more if others worked more in the past). This encouragement effect increases or decreases the amount of work players put into the project, depending on the type of uncertainty faced.

Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment (with Christoph Kuzmics)

We propose a novel challenge for assessing the predictive power of a theory of one shotplay in games (subjects playing a game exactly once): we test the predictive power of theories in situations for which we do not (yet) have any data. To do so, we consider a variety of such theories and fix their parameter estimates from the recent large scale meta-analysis of Wright and Leyton-Brown (2017). We then compare the predictive power of these theories, measured in terms of log-likelihood, for a series of symmetric hawk-dove games played in the lab. We find that even for such a narrow class of games, no theory is uniformly better than all others across all treatments. Furthermore, the theory that provides the highest overall log-likelihood for our data is Nash equilibrium with risk aversion, with an estimated risk aversion parameter taken from Hey and Orme (1994) and its replication in Harrison and Rutström (2009). In particular, it significantly beats the two theories (based on quantal level k and cognitive hierarchy models) which performed best in Wright and Leyton-Brown's (2017) standard out-of-sample prediction task.

REFERENCES

Christoph Kuzmics

Department of Economics, University of Graz
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Wieland Müller

Department of Economics & Vienna Center for Experimental Economics, University of Vienna
Department of Economics, Tilburg University
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Frank Riedel

Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University
frank.riedel@uni-bielefeld.de