When Decoys Fail: Evidence from Video Game Edition Choice
Fábián Garas; Botond Ujvári; Philipp Külpmann; Andreas Orland
Working paper (2026).
Abstract
We study whether classic decoy effects generalize to a consequential digital marketplace setting. In a preregistered, incentivized online field experiment designed to resemble the Steam storefront, 435 participants repeatedly chose between a cheaper base video game edition and a more expensive target edition, with or without a third option constructed as an attraction or compromise decoy. Contrary to standard decoy predictions, neither decoy increased target choice in the full sample. Decoys were themselves chosen at nontrivial rates, and descriptive, non-inferiority, and regression analyses indicate small, null, or opposite-direction effects when decoy choosers are excluded. The results suggest that familiar, information-rich, and consequential platform settings can substantially weaken classical decoy effects. More broadly, the paper shows that choice architecture in digital markets should be tested in the environments in which it is intended to operate.Links and resources
Working paper available upon request